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RESUMEN 
En nuestro artículo nos centramos en las principales críticas al representacionalismo 
desarrolladas por Huw Price en su trabajo “Naturalism without Representationalism”, 
unas críticas que sientan las bases de su primer argumento contra el naturalismo del 
objeto. Con posterioridad examinamos su segundo argumento, el que se sigue de sus 
consideraciones sobre la posibilidad de comenzar con una concepción material de los 
problemas de la localización. 
 




In our paper we first focus on Price´s central objections to representationalism in his 
“Naturalism without Rpresentationalism”, which pave the way for his first argument 
against object naturalism –in his terms, they throw doubts on the possibility of 
‘validating’ object naturalism. Then, we will examine his second argument, stemming 
from his considerations on the possibility of starting off with a material conception of 
the placement problems 
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1. INTRODUCTION: PLACEMENT PROBLEMS AND THE TWO HORNS OF A 
DILEMMA 
The chapter we will comment on, “Naturalism without 
Representationalism”, is focused on philosophical naturalism, that is, the 
general doctrine that philosophy is not an enterprise different from science. 
Price starts out by setting forth two different versions of naturalism available 
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to Contemporary philosophers: the widespread object naturalism, according to 
which the world studied by science is all there is and all knowledge is thus 
scientific knowledge, and what he takes to be a more fundamental form, subject 
naturalism, namely, the perspective that ‘philosophy has to begin with what 
science tells us about ourselves’ (p. 186). His main claim is that subject naturalism is 
theoretically prior to object naturalism and provides us with a perspective from which object 
naturalism can be rejected, given that it rests on a set of semantic presuppositions that are 
completely untenable, more specifically, on the substantial conception of reference and truth 
that is characteristic of representationalism. His objections to it, central to the 
chapter, can be taken to contribute to the well-known set of criticisms to 
representationalism put forward by Rorty and other pragmatists 
(paradigmatically, Rorty 1979, Brandom 1994). In the second part of the 
chapter, he considers the possibility of adopting a different starting point, 
which ends up involving the object naturalist with the very same substantial 
semantic notions that have been found deeply problematic. The conclusion is 
that the only available option for those philosophers with naturalistic leanings 
seems to be embracing the subject, non-representationalist version. From this 
perspective, accounting in naturalistic terms for the difference between, for 
instance, moral values and mathematical truths comes down to accounting for 
the difference between two different kinds of linguistic practices. To put it in 
Wittgensteinian terms, there are linguistic practices all the way down.1  
Let´s us reconstruct Price´s argumentative line with some more detail. 
According to him, the robust semantic presuppositions characteristic of 
representationalism play a crucial role in the statement of the so-called 
‘placement problems’, namely, the problems of locating phenomena such as 
morality, mathematics, causality, intentionality, etc. within a naturalistic 
                                                            
1Notice the strong Wittgensteinian tone of the following fragment: “The challenge is now to 
explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us come to talk in these various ways. This is a 
matter of explaining what role the different language games play in our lives –what differences there are 
between the functions of talk of value and the functions of talk of electrons, for instance. This 
certainly requires plurality in the world, but of a familiar kind, in a familiar place. Nobody 
expects human behaviour to be anything other than highly complex. Without 
representationalism, the joints between topics remain joints between kinds of behaviour, and 
don´t need to be mirrored in ontology of any other kind.” (Price, 2010, p. 199, our emphasis) 
From now on, unless something different is explicitly pointed out, all the quotes included in 
this article belong to the text that we are commenting on. 
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framework or general view of reality. He distinguishes two different ways of 
conceiving of those problems: the material and the linguistic conceptions. The 
difference can be simply put in the following terms: a placement problem for 
X is, according to the material conception, a problem about the thing X, 
whereas, for the linguistic conception, it is rather a problem about the term X. 
Each conception takes placement problems to concern something different: 
objects or facts and linguistic practices, respectively. This opens the possibility of two 
horns for an object naturalist´s dilemma: she may start out with either a 
material or a linguistic conception of placement problems. To take the latter 
first, on the assumption that placement problems are linguistic ones, the object 
naturalist will then focus on the referents of the relevant terms. For example, if 
she were concerned with morality, she would shift the focus from ‘morally 
correct’ to moral correctness itself. Now, the transition from terms to their 
referents rests on the assumption of a substantial, non-deflationary conception of 
semantic relations, namely, relations between natural language words, on the one 
hand, and objects and properties in the world, on the other. As we have 
mentioned, Price takes any commitment to the existence of such relations to 
be deeply problematic. With regard to the material horn, he considers it to be a 
dead end as well, for two main reasons. First, it closes up the possibility for a 
naturalist philosopher to draw conclusions on the basis of our characteristic 
use of language. Secondly, he points out that semantic notions have become a 
significant part of the conceptual tools of Contemporary metaphysics. And he 
seems to think that this is as it should be: there is no other option for a 
metaphysician tan going semantic. As a consequence, by adopting the material 
conception, the object naturalist ends up being committed to the very same 
deeply problematic semantic notions of reference and truth that were central to 
the linguistic conception.  
In what follows we are going to first focus on Price´s central objections 
to representationalism, which pave the way for his first argument against object 
naturalism –in his terms, they throw doubts on the possibility of ‘validating’ 
object naturalism. Then, we will examine his second argument, stemming from 
his considerations on the possibility of starting off with a material conception 
of the placement problems.  
2. ON THE LINGUISTIC HORN 
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We will start out our analysis of Price´s exploration of the first, 
linguistic horn by quoting a long but significant fragment of the text: 
 
Given a linguistic view of the placement issue, then, substantial, non-
deflationary semantic notions turn out to play a critical theoretical role in the 
foundations of object naturalism. Without such notions, there can be no 
subsequent issue about the natural ‘place’ of entities such as meanings, causes, 
values, and the like. Object naturalism thus rests on substantial theoretical 
assumptions about what we humans do with language –roughly, the 
assumption that substantial ‘word-world’ semantic relations are a part of the 
best scientific account of our use of the relevant terms. (p. 190) 
 
So, representationalism is the position to get rid of. He makes three 
main points against it. First, he claims that there is a very attractive alternative 
to holding a substantial truth-conditional semantics: going deflationist about 
reference and truth while appealing to a use account of semantic notions; to 
put it in a nutshell, defending a substantial truth-conditional semantics is not 
compulsory. Second, he briefly mentions a problem of indeterminacy that may 
affect the theory of reference, inspired by Stich´s discussion on the concept of 
belief (Stich, 1996). Third, he puts forward what we take to be his main 
objection, composed in turn of different claims: (i) it is not possible to have an 
empirical attitude with respect to the substantial semantic relations themselves, 
in particular, it is not possible to acknowledge their contingent character, which clearly 
contradicts the object naturalist´s principles; (ii) the possibility of considering that there is no 
need for substantial semantic relations gets open for (who should be no longer regarded 
as an object but) a subject naturalist. He then suggests that the object naturalist 
risks being incoherent –he does not want to rest his case on the incoherence 
charge, though, but on the weaker claim that there is no need for a naturalist to 
encompass substantial semantic relations as a constitutive part of the furniture 
of the world. Moreover, he waves at Putnam´s model theoretic argument: 
“The problem is not that there is no right answer, but that there are too many 
right answers.” (p. 195) We will say little about the first point, nothing about 
the second, but pay special attention to the third and more developed one.  
Let´s us begin by focusing on the third objection: in Price´s own words 
 
In view of the fact that object naturalism presupposes the semantic notions in 
this way, it is doubtful whether these notions themselves can consistently be 
investigated in an object naturalist spirit. Naturalism of this kind seems to be 
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committed to the empirical contingency of semantic relations. For any given 
term or sentence, it must be to some extent an empirical matter whether, and 
if so to what, that terms refers; whether, and if so where, it has a truthmaker. 
However, it seems impossible to make sense of this empirical attitude with respect to the 
semantic terms themselves. (p. 19, our emphasis) 
 
It is not at all clear to us why the object naturalist could not take 
reference and truth to be contingent semantic relations, namely, why she could 
not think that there might have been other semantic relations or no semantic 
relations at all. The alleged fact that in the actual world the adequate semantic 
relations are substantial reference and truth is perfectly compatible with 
thinking that there are other worlds where there are other semantic relations in 
play and even some worlds, where there are no human beings and no natural 
language is thus spoken or written, where there aren´t any kind of semantic 
relations whatsoever.  
The only reason that Price seems to offer in favour of his claim is his 
support of Boghossian´s transcendental argument against semantic irrealism o 
anti-realism (Boghossian, 1990). According to it, semantic anti-realism is 
incoherent since semantic notions are presupposed in the very statement of the 
thesis, as much as in the whole debate between realists and anti-realists. 
Boghossian ´s conclusion is that a realistic, though non-naturalistic, stance 
towards semantic content is necessary –namely, it should be non-contingently 
adopted. 2  Price´s suggestion is, instead, taking up the subject naturalist 
alternative. Notice the following fragment: 
 
Boghossian takes the point to amount to a transcendental argument for a 
non-naturalist realism about semantic content. In my view, however, it is 
better seen as a pro-naturalist –pro-subject-naturalist- point, in that it exposes 
what is inevitably a non-naturalistic presupposition in the leading 
contemporary conception of what is involved in taking science seriously in 
philosophy. (p. 193) 
 
                                                            
2 In other words, anti-realism about substantial semantic relations cannot be considered to be 
an empirical possibility. 
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Now, there are some aspects of this suggestion we would like to 
comment on. First, there is no reason to accept Boghossian´s argument, which 
we find flawed. From the premise that the semantic anti-realist has to use 
language to state her thesis and express her disagreement with the realist, it 
does not follow that she has to subscribe to the realist´s terms: what she is 
presupposing is that there is an alternative explanation of what she is doing, 
which does not appeal to substantial reference and truth –it may be even a 
purely physical phenomenon, fully accountable in neurological terms, or a 
completely pragmatic one. So, there is no reason to think that the thesis that 
there is a level of semantic content that has to be accounted for in terms of 
reference and truth is itself a necessary truth, and coming back to Price´s 
argument, Boghossian´s argument provides him with no reason to think that 
the semantic presuppositions held by the object naturalist are necessary –
which, on the assumption that any naturalistic thesis must be contingent, 
would have plunged her into incoherence.  
Second, it is not at all clear why Price thinks that accepting 
Boghossian´s argument, as he seems to agree to, might serve to pave the way 
for adopting his favourite position, subject naturalism: if one accepted the 
argument, one wouldn´t be able to help being committed to substantial 
reference and truth. 
Third, although he says that he does not want to press on the 
incoherence charge, he ends up illustrating what he has in mind by entertaining 
two alternative possibilities as to what reference might be: 
 
The first account claims that the ordinary term “Reference” picks out, or 
refers to, the relation R* -in other words, by its own lights, that 
 
“Reference” stands in the relation R* to the relation R* 
 
The second account claims that the ordinary term “Reference” picks out, or 
refers to, the relation R** -in other words, by its own lights, that 
 
“Reference” stands in the relation R** to the relation R** 
 
Are these claims incompatible? Not at all. The term “Reference” might very 
well stand in these two different relations to two different things, even if we 
allow (as proponents of both views will want to insist), that in the case of 
each relation singly, no term could stand in that relation to both. (p. 194) 
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The fact that the term ‘reference’ might stand in those different relations 
to different things, namely, that it might be interpreted or understood in those 
different ways does not imply that there is no possibility of finding empirical 
evidence in favour of one of them so as to prefer it to the other. Likewise, the 
fact that the term ‘light’ might be interpreted or understood in two or more 
different ways (as it happens, some have thought that it refers to a particle 
whereas others took it to refer to a wave), does not imply that there is no 
possibility of finding empirical evidence in favour of one of those conceptions 
so as to prefer it to the other. For the object naturalist, ‘reference’ is in no way 
different from ‘light’ and the rest of theoretical terms: there might be different 
empirical conceptions about the intended phenomena, and finding strong 
evidence for a certain theory is the only way to choose among them. So, in as 
far as she may say that according to our best physical theory, ‘light’ refers to the 
so and so, she may also say that according to our best semantic theory, 
‘reference’ refers to the such and such –in both cases, the reference of the terms 
involved might have been different from what it in fact is, which means that 
both theses are contingent ones. Therefore, there does not seem to be possible 
to run an incoherence argument against her on this basis. 
However, the previous considerations notwithstanding, we think that 
Price has put together two notions that should be kept apart: contingency and 
aposterioricity or empirical character. As forcefully argued by Kripke (1980), one 
may think that scientific theoretical identifications are a posteriori but necessary: 
their aposterioricity is grounded on the fact that they are known by virtue of 
experience, hence not a priori, whereas their necessity is grounded on the fact 
that simple general terms for natural kinds (such as ‘light’, ‘heat’, ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, 
‘water’, etc.) are akin to rigid designators, namely, they express the same 
property in all possible worlds -alternatively, one may think that they express 
an essential property of an individual or a sample, namely, a property that the 
individual or the sample has in all the worlds.3 To take one of Kripke’s 
examples, a statement such as 
                                                            
3 See the different conceptions of rigidity put forward for general terms as a consequence of 
Kripke´s thesis. Paradigmatic examples of the identity of designation conception are Linsky 
(1984), LaPorte (2000) and Salmon (2005), whereas Devitt & Sterelny (1999) and Devitt (2005) 
typically exemplify the essentialist conception. 
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(1) Water is H2O 
 
is both a posteriori, that is, known on the basis of experience, and 
necessary, namely, true in all possible worlds, given that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ 
express the same natural substance in all of them: hence if true in the actual 
world, (1) will be true in all the other possible ones. From this perspective, 
there is no incompatibility between being empirical or a posteriori and being 
necessary. Now, on the object naturalist´s assumption that reference is a 
natural kind and ‘reference’, a simple general term for a natural kind, hence 
rigid, a statement such as 
 
(2) Reference is relation R* 
 
would turn out to be both a posteriori and necessary: for ‘reference’, as 
well as for ‘water’ and ‘light’, being empirical would then be perfectly 
compatible with having a fixed referent across all the possible worlds, which 
would make the statement establishing its identity necessary. So, even if 
semantic statements like (2) were taken to be necessary, this would be no 
obstacle to making sense of the ‘empirical attitude with respect to the semantic 
terms themselves’ that is expected to be present in an object naturalist. 
Is there an incompatibility between what has been said in the two 
previous paragraphs? We do not think so, on the following grounds. On the 
one hand, one might have come to find out that reference is something different 
from what it in fact is –in other words, the word ‘reference’ might have been 
used to refer to something different from what it is in fact used to refer to. On 
the other hand, reference might not have been different from what it in fact is 
-if one takes the actual use of ‘reference’ as fixed, there is no possible world in 
which it refers to something different, since it is a rigid general term. So, for 
instance, if it refers to R* in the actual world, it will refer to that very same 
relation in all other worlds. (Likewise, if ‘water’ refers to H2O in the actual 
world, it will refer to that very substance in all the possible ones.) In more 
Kripkean terms, in a counterfactual world where ‘reference’ were used in a 
different way, it might have turned out that reference was not R* (on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
The Problem of living a philosophical life without object naturalism  33 
 
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014 
assumption that this is what the term refers to as a matter of fact): that is an 
epistemic possibility, namely, one might be in a position to find out that the term 
is being used in a different way; however, once the term is used as it is, it refers 
to R* in all the worlds, since it is not metaphysically possible for reference not to 
be what it in fact is –which makes a statement such as (2) necessary if true.4 
Moreover, Price concludes that a naturalist ‘has neither need nor 
automatic entitlement to a substantial account of semantic relations between 
words or thoughts and the rest of the natural world’ (p. 194). He thus seems to 
suggest an interesting distinction between an entitlement question and a need 
question regarding the existence of substantial semantic relations.5 According to 
it, there are two different questions for an object naturalist to pose: on the one 
hand, she may wonder whether she is entitled to posit substantial semantic 
relations, namely, whether that kind of relations fit in her general naturalistic 
ontological commitment; on the other hand, she may wonder whether positing 
them satisfies any theoretical need. As far as the former question is concerned, 
the object naturalist takes it to be an open empirical question, which must be 
answered on the basis of an empirical search. Prices points out that there is no 
automatic entitlement; but why should the entitlement be automatic? Far from 
that, we think that for an object naturalist the entitlement question can only be 
settled by reflecting on whether there is a well-developed conception of 
substantial semantic relations that becomes acceptable by naturalistic 
standards. As for the question of whether substantial semantic relations are 
needed, the object naturalist has given a positive answer to it: they are needed to 
explain meaning.  
Finally, in connection with the last point and also with the above-
mentioned first objection, we would like to suggest, on behalf of the object 
naturalist, that pointing to the fact that deflationism represents a theoretical 
alternative does not amount to offering an argument against substantial truth-
conditional semantics. As acknowledged by Price, deflationism about reference 
and truth should be complemented by a use account of semantic terms. The 
                                                            
4 For the difference between epistemic and metaphysical possibility, see Kripke (1980, 2nd. 
Conference). 
5 For that distinction see also Devitt (1991, pp. 83-107). 
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point is that one may have reasons not to hold a general use account and 
prefer, instead, any kind of truth-conditional semantics –given the stronger 
explanatory scope of such theories, especially on their intensional versions. 
Price claims: 
 
The answer to Boghossian´s challenge to deflationism thus depends on a 
distinction between denying in one´s theoretical voice that these terms refer or have 
truth-conditions (which Boghossian is right to point out that a deflationist 
cannot do); and being silent in one´s theoretical voice about whether these terms 
refer or have truth-conditions. A deflationist can, indeed must, do the latter, 
having couched her theoretical claims about the terms concerned in other 
terms entirely –and having insisted, qua deflationist, that the semantic notions 
do no interesting causal-explanatory work. (p. 192) 
 
To us, the main point is not whether deflationism can offer an answer 
to Boghossian´s transcendental argument –as stated above, we think that the 
challenge can be met without problem: there is no incoherence in 
presupposing that a different account of language use is at work. The real 
challenge is, though, making that account explicit, namely, offering an adequate 
theory of our linguistic practices that does not appeal to substantial reference 
and truth; to put it in Price´s recently quoted words, the deflationist has to 
manage to be very specific about how she ‘couches her theoretical claims 
about the terms concerned in other terms entirely’. If exploiting a use account 
were the only hope for a deflationist, she may not end up representing a viable 
theoretical alternative after all: as it is known, use accounts do not afford 
acceptable semantic explanations for all kinds of natural language expressions 
–take, for instance, proper names, natural kind general terms and indexicals. In 
the light of that, the object naturalism could still claim that substantial 
reference and truth are needed to explain meaning: it is then the answer to the 
above-mentioned need question that would provide her with a clear motivation 
to posit those substantial semantic concepts. 
3. ON THE MATERIAL HORN 
The reasons put forward by Price against the adoption of a material 
conception of placement problems presuppose that the notion of linguistic 
practice can, and must, be assigned a central role in the study of matters as 
diverse as, for example, values, causality and modality.  
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What is wrong with it [the material conception], I think, is that it amounts to 
the proposal that we should simply ignore the possibility that philosophy 
might have something to learn from naturalistic –subject naturalistic- reflection 
on the things that we humans do with language. (p. 196) 
 
However, the object naturalist may think that ‘the things that we 
humans do with language’ are not directly relevant to answering questions 
concerning, for instance, the nature of values, causes or modal facts. As 
explicitly acknowledged by the author, prima facie those are questions 
concerning things rather than terms, namely, ontological questions. So, prima 
facie, without further argument, there is no reason to think that ontological 
issues can be settled by reflecting upon our own linguistic practices. If an 
object naturalist did not take the nature of values, for instance, to depend on 
our use of evaluative expressions or our making evaluative judgments under 
certain conditions, she would have no inclination to start off with either a 
semantic analysis of evaluative expressions or a pragmatic analysis of evaluative 
force. Something similar holds for causality and modality: if an object naturalist 
thought that there were de re causes and modalities, namely, that causal 
relations and modal properties were neither psychological features nor 
properties of natural language sentences, she would find no reason to establish 
conclusions regarding causality or modality on the basis of examining our 
causal or modal talk or our linguistic practices involving causal or modal 
expressions respectively. 6  Therefore, unless such an argument is provided 
(namely, an argument concerning the propriety, to go on with the previous 
examples, of reducing morality to speech acts of moral evaluation, causality to 
psychological association and modality to a set of sentence properties), Price´s 
first consideration against taking the material mode option is not, from our 
perspective, adequately justified. The Wittgensteinian picture that Price is so 
happy about may be a point of arrival, after some forceful arguments for it are 
provided, but cannot be a point of departure in arguing against the object 
naturalist –unless one does not mind begging the question.  
                                                            
6 Needless to say, in the case of meaning, the relevance of taking linguistic practices as a starting 
point cannot be questioned. 
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Moreover, Price notices that semantic notions (either substantial or 
deflationary) have become typical conceptual tools of Contemporary 
metaphysics. He seems to infer from that observation that there is no possible 
way of doing metaphysics without resorting to semantic notions. But this is a 
non-sequitur: from the fact that certain philosophers have established ontological 
conclusions on the basis of semantic premises, it does not follow that 
ontological theses must always be based on semantic considerations. A historical 
statement cannot serve to ground a conceptual claim about what metaphysics 
is about. Granted, many philosophers have adopted a semantic starting point 
in doing metaphysics –a paradigmatic example is Dummett, who grounded 
metaphysical anti-realism on a verificationistic semantics (Dummett, 1975 y 
1976) as much as most philosophers taking part in the Contemporary debate 
on realism and anti-realism (such as Davidson, 1977; Goodman, 1978; Putnam, 
1981). However, we think that the adoption of a semantic starting point in 
doing metaphysics is a theoretical decision that cries out for justification: an 
alternative strategy would be starting out with a general thesis about the world 
as a whole to then pass on to establish particular theses about particular 
aspects of that whole –among which, there is the human being and her peculiar 
linguistic capacity. That has a certain rationale, since why should our more 
general views –namely, our conception of what there is in general, what 
categories of things there are, etc.- be determined by our view about a 
particular aspect –namely, our conception of human language and the way it 
relates to other human actions-, and not the other way around? It seems to 
make more sense to start out with a general picture to then see whether 
particular conceptions of different phenomena fit in than modelling the general 
picture on the basis of the conclusions drawn from reflecting on just one 
particular aspect, namely, the linguistic practices characteristic of human 
beings. This raises a methodological point that should be considered and 
discarded before claiming, as Price does, that semantic notions are essential to 
metaphysics –or, in other terms, that metaphysics is necessarily concerned with 
semantic notions.7 
                                                            
7 The methodological point at stake has been strongly emphasized by Michael Devitt; from his 
perspective, metaphysics comes first. Notice what he says about the relation between realism, a 
metaphysical doctrine, and correspondence truth, a semantic conception: “Realism is about the 
nature of reality in general, about what there is and what it is like; it is about the largely 
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Moreover, on the assumption that the semantic notions at stake were 
thought to be substantial ones, metaphysics would turn out to be impossible, a 
dead end: if metaphysics could not help deploying fatally flawed substantial 
semantic notions, then it should be given up.8 Price seems thus to provide us 
with a reductio ad absurdum of Contemporary metaphysics, which could be 
summarized by means of the following argument: 
  
(1) Substantial reference and truth are essential conceptual tools of 
Contemporary metaphysics.  
(2) But substantial reference and truth are untenable (almost 
incoherent).  
So, 
(3) Contemporary metaphysics is not a viable theoretical activity.9 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This piece of writing has begun by identifying Price’s main claim: 
subject naturalism is theoretically prior to object naturalism, and provides us 
with a perspective from which it can be invalidated, given its dependence on 
the substantial conception of reference and truth that is the core of 
representationalism. So, the rejection of object naturalism involves, basically, 
the rejection of representationalism.  
Price’s argumentative path consists in elucidating how the robust 
semantic presuppositions characteristic of representationalism play a relevant 
                                                                                                                                                        
inanimate impersonal world. If correspondence truth has a place, it is in our theory of only a 
small part of that reality: in our theory of people and their language.” (Devitt, 1991, p. 43).  
8 On the other hand, on a deflationary conception of the semantic notions in play, the 
objection presented in the text turns out to be obscure: “If they don´t appeal to substantial 
semantic relations, they avoid these difficulties, but lose the theoretical resources with which to 
formulate a general argument for naturalism, conceived on the object naturalist model.” (Price, 
2011, p. 198) The reasons for this claim are utterly mysterious to us. 
9 Be that as it may, there seem to be many debates in Contemporary metaphysics that are 
utterly devoid of semantic notions, either substantial or deflationary ones –to mention just a 
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role in the statement of the so-called ‘placement problems’, i.e., the problems 
of locating phenomena such as morality, causality and modality in a naturalistic 
picture of reality. Object naturalism, the alternative Price wants to rule out, has 
two ways of conceiving of those problems: the material conception and the 
linguistic one. They can be taken to function as two horns of a dilemma for the 
object naturalist: she may start out with either a material or a linguistic 
conception of placement problems. On both alternatives, according to Price, 
she ends up being committed to the deeply problematic semantic notions of 
reference and truth.  
So far so good, but it does not go that far. From our critical assessment 
of Price’s position, it follows that the object naturalist can still take reference 
and truth to be both substantial and empirical relations. Moreover, we consider 
that the Wittgensteinian picture pressed by Price can be a point of arrival but 
cannot be, as he seems to intend, a point of departure in arguing against the 
object naturalist –at the risk of begging the question. Finally, we believe that it 
is not true that metaphysics cannot help resorting to semantic notions. The 
availability of metaphysical thought totally devoid of such notions shows that 
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